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sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.

It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the *consistency* of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decis-

ion of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.

The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,

* * * "proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glibby essence."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

[Translated from the French of Charles Bénard by JAS. A. MARTLING.]

IV. MUSIC.—Art represents, under different forms, the development of spirit. It is, accordingly, the degree of spirituality in the mode of expression which assigns to each of the arts its rank, its pre-eminence, and which serves to fix its relations.

Architecture is the most imperfect art, expressing thought in a vague manner only, through forms borrowed from inorganic matter. Next, *Sculpture* represents spirit, but still as identified with the body, and only so far as corporeal form allows. *Painting* expresses the innermost and profoundest side of the soul, passion, and moral sentiment. Hence it rejects matter, in order that it may confine itself to surface. It employs visible appearance and color as a richer, more varied and more spiritual mode of expression. Nevertheless this appearance is always borrowed from the visible, extended, and permanent form.

There is in the soul a necessity for signs, for materials, more in conformity with its nature, presenting nothing fixed and extended, and where the material side wholly disappears.

This need is supplied in *Music*. Its end is to express the soul in itself, the inner sentiment, by a sign which no longer offers anything extended or material, by a sign invisible, rapid and fleeing as the movements of

soul itself. This sign, which is, however, still produced by means of matter, no more recalls extension and its forms, but is sound, the result of the undulatory vibration of bodies.

As music abandons visible forms, it addresses itself to a new organ, to the hearing, a sense more spiritual, though less contemplative, than vision. The ear perceives this unextended sign, the resultant of that vibration which leaves no trace after it, and vanishes in its expression.

By thus divesting itself of external and material form, sound is eminently fitted to be the echo of the soul and of sentiment. Accordingly, the problem of music will be to awake the inmost chords of the soul, and to reproduce all its movements and emotions.

Thereby, also, its effects are explained. Its aim is to reach the utmost limit of sentiment; it is the art of *sentiment*. Between art and sentiment there exists so intimate a union that they seemingly fuse together. Sound, that immaterial phenomenon, without proper duration, instantaneous, borrowing all its value from the sentiment which it veils, penetrates into the soul and echoes through its depths.

If we compare music with the other arts, we find, in the first place, that it exhibits certain real analogies with *Architecture*. If

this, indeed, expresses ideas only symbolically and vaguely, music also limits itself to the accompanying of conceptions of spirit, of which language alone is the clear and truthful expression.

In the next place, architecture does not borrow from nature forms already complete; it invents them, or fashions them, according to geometric rules and proportions. Now music also, independently of the expression of sentiment, follows the law of numbers, which determines the measure, the length, the accord of sounds. It introduces among sounds, as architecture among forms, regularity, symmetry, and harmony. This is what has caused architecture to be styled *mute music*.

Meanwhile, by the side of these resemblances, still greater differences are manifested between these two arts; for, if the laws of number and quantity form their common base, their materials are of a nature directly opposite. Architecture appropriates to itself ponderable matter and external forms; music employs sound, an invisible, mobile, fugitive element, borrowed not from space but from time—sound, a sign full of soul and life.

These two arts appertain, then, to two entirely different spheres of the spirit. While architecture lifts up its colossal images which the eye contemplates in their symbolic form and their eternal immobility, the rapid world of sound penetrates immediately by the ear into the interior of the soul and fills it with emotions of sympathy.

Sculpture is the art farthest removed from music. Painting, however, exhibits a great affinity with it: it approaches it, in fact, in vivacity of expression. Nevertheless painting represents external and visible forms which already exist in nature. The artist does not invent these forms; he is limited to generalizing and spiritualizing them; while the musician, receiving indeed a text, invents the most proper combinations to express the sentiments of the soul which connect themselves with it. Its proper field is sentiment in its abstract simplicity. To form it, he has only to return into himself, to go down into the depths of his soul. He may, indeed, sometimes go to the extent of forgetting his subject in order to express his own emotions. It also belongs to this art to effect an enfranchisement of the soul, to free it from the wants and miseries of actual existence, to cause it to forget its sorrows.

Music secures this freedom in the highest degree.

Sculpture and painting have only to bring out the idea already contained in the subject, to gather about it its accessories and details. Though a musical work ought not to miss this interior connection and this unity, its mode of development is wholly different. The musical theme is quickly exhausted; the principal thought remains the centre; but this succession necessitates, with a flight, a return, oppositions, conflicts, transitions, sudden turns, unexpected conclusions. Accordingly, the unity is far from resembling that of the members and their proportions in a statue, or in the arrangement of a picture.

Music is distinguished from the other arts in this respect: it is too near the free world of the soul not to have the right of placing itself above the given subject, and even the thought which it makes its content. The artist here is free to abandon himself to his genius and his fancies. Its laws are those of sounds; and they as such do not bind themselves strictly to the thought and to the sense of words, as visible forms are united to the idea which they represent.

If, in fine, one compares music to poetry, it exhibits a great affinity with it, but also profound differences.

In poetry, the sound is not modulated by instruments. The articulate sound of the voice is only an oral sign, in itself void of sense, and more or less independent of the idea which it expresses; hence a striking difference between musical and poetical employment of sound. Music does not reduce sound to the condition of a mere means, a sign of the thought; it makes of it its end; it fashions it in itself and for itself.

But what poetry thus loses as to the immediate expression of visible objects, it regains in presenting them to the imagination. In a word, it forms pictures for the spirit. Music should waive this prerogative; it is confined to expressing a certain harmony, a sympathetic relation between sounds and ideas or objects. It thus gives a vague idea of the moral situation; it succeeds even in communicating a certain excitement to the imagination, but without giving rise to the actual image of the objects and of their determinate form.

Music and poetry, moreover, readily intermarry; but the two arts remain no less distinct, and preserve their independence.

If the poetic work is perfect, it must expect little aid from music; and if the music is the principal aim, the poetic text should be subordinate and superficial; it merely furnishes a simple canvas. The interest cannot divide itself equally, as is exemplified by the Italian opera.

The nature and the proper sphere of music being understood, it is easy to determine the special manner in which it must conceive its subject. Although it can free itself from it to a certain extent, nevertheless it should, in order to produce its true effect, express a thought. But how? Not as thought, as idea clear or abstract, as general notion: it is as *sentiment*. It ought not to undertake to labor in the service of the imagination; that care concerns the other arts: it should confine itself to rendering comprehensible the sentiments of the soul—the inner and emotional part of man—this is its proper object. “To express in sounds that inner life, those mysterious movements of the soul, or to combine that harmonious echo with the language of words which express thoughts, to baptize in some way this frigid language in the living fountain of sympathetic sentiment,—such is the difficult task which falls to the lot of music.”

Although thus restrained, its domain is not the less an extensive one; for the sphere of sentiment is infinitely vast and varied. On the other hand, it ought not to express sentiment, as it escapes naturally from the soul, in a spontaneous cry; but to sweeten, to temper that expression by its measures and cadences, fashioned according to the laws of harmony and rhythm. It is by this only that it is an art, and that among all the arts it is the best adapted to calm the violence of natural emotions, to work out the enfranchisement of the soul, to transport it into a serener and purer sphere.

The power with which music acts upon the soul, and chiefly upon the sensibility, is explained by these principles. “It does not go so far as to awaken the conceptions of the intellect, nor so far as to evoke in the spirit, images which divide and captivate its attention; it centres itself in the profound region of sentiment. Placed in the seat of the inner changes of the soul, at the central point of the whole man, it agitates and moves the whole.”

If, in this connection, we compare anew music with the other arts, we shall understand the different manner in which they

act upon us, and the peculiar effects of music. In the arts of design, the spectacle and the spectator are distinct, set over against one another. In music, the sounds are distinct from us, but the opposition does not go so far as the fixedness of a permanent spectacle. Sounds are instantaneous. Music thus penetrates immediately to the inner focus of the movements of the soul: that loses its contemplative liberty; the musical expression excites and transports us. Sound acts as an element, as a force of nature. The *me* is not seized by some point of its spiritual existence; it is lifted up and placed wholly in movement. Add to this the power of measure and rhythm, which act mechanically upon us, and we shall have the explanations of the effects of music.

By measure, indeed, sound penetrates into the *me* from another side; it seizes our very being, and draws us into its cadenced movement.

We ought not, however, to exaggerate this power of music, and, especially, not to isolate it too much from thought itself—from religious, moral, scientific thought, etc. Music produces its most extraordinary effects only on barbarous or half civilized people. The prodigies which are related about this subject belong to fable. The lyre of Amphion only moved stones, that of Orpheus tamed tigers; but to civilized man other more serious means are necessary: the power of religious and moral ideas, laws, institutions. Man is not an animal, nor a purely sensual being. It is reason that it is necessary to be able to address; she it is that it is necessary to persuade. To-day Music retains its charms, and produces a part of its effects; but it is an art, and its sphere of action is more restricted and subordinate. It has power to accompany the transports of religious thought, inflame patriotic sentiment, sustain the march of soldiers and preserve their courage; but it is not to it that are due the prodigies of faith. Nevertheless does it cause the walls of cities to fall.

Hegel does not confine himself to these generalities upon music; he enters into an examination of the different parts which constitute the theory of this art. Under the head of *musical means of expression*, he seeks to give a philosophic explication of *time*, *measure*, *rhythm*; then of *harmony* and *melody*.

We must follow him in this part, which, although abstract, does not lack interest from the point of view of the metaphysics of art.

1. In order to observe the gradation of ideas, to go from the simple to the complex among the means of expression which music employs, we commence with those which are connected with the duration of sounds, to wit: *time, measure, and rhythm.*

The preponderance of time in music is explained by the very nature of *sound*. Sound, that invisible and unextended phenomenon which is produced in space only under the form of oscillatory movement, is successive. It falls, accordingly, under the law of time. This succession of points of duration needs to be fixed and regulated. Music ought, then, not only to admit time as a necessary element, but to impose upon it a determined measure by a mathematical rule.

But a more profound reason for the importance of measure is the close analogy which exists between it and the soul itself, which in the continuous succession of sound perceives its proper identity, and acquires the feeling of its inner life and its permanent activity. Whatever brings it back to a sense of itself and its nature agreeably entertains it.

Now, in order that duration may not lose itself in the vague and indeterminate, it is necessary that it should have a commencement, an end, and marked divisions. The *ego* finds itself, and is satisfied in this variety and this diversity only so far as the intervals of time are brought back to unity. This fixed, regular, and mathematically determined unity is measure. It fills, in music, the same office as regularity in architecture.

Then, in this uniformity of measure, the *ego* finds the image of its proper unity; it recognizes in the return and equality of measure its proper identity; it sees that it is itself which introduces this measure into the succession of time: the pleasure which it receives is by so much the more vivid as the measure there, is its work, and as it is its proper unity which serves it in measuring sounds. Measure, here, far more truly than in the movements of the heavenly bodies, proceeds from the spirit; it is even more truly the work of the spirit than in architecture, which imitates the movements of nature, and follows the analogies which it finds there.

But, in order that the measure may be the more striking, it is necessary that diversity and inequality break the uniformity; that irregularity be combined with regularity, and be itself led back to unity. Hence the different species of *measures*.

Finally, in order to give to measure more richness, animation, and liberty, it is necessary that the essential divisions of measure be marked in a more precise manner. This engenders rhythm with its varied forms, which combine themselves with the corresponding forms of rhythm in poetry, without however being wholly confounded with them.

2. What precedes concerns the duration of sound and quantity. The second side, which furnishes more of richness and variety, has regard to the very nature of sound and its *quality*. The nature of sounds is determined, in the first place, by that of the instruments which produce them; then by the manner in which they are co-ordinated; finally, by the forms which they adopt by their apposition, their reconciliation, their various modulations, and their reciprocal fusion. The laws which regulate them are those of harmony.

As to the *instruments*, they consist sometimes of a confined and vibrating column of air (wind instruments), sometimes of a stretched cord (stringed instruments), sometimes of a plain or curved surface, etc., of glass or metal. The linear direction predominates in true musical instruments, for there exists a secret analogy between linear sounds and the deepest feelings of the soul. A plane or rounded surface furnishes instruments of an inferior character, which do not respond to energy of sentiment. But the instrument *par excellence* is the *human voice*, which unites the characters of wind instruments and string instruments. The human voice is the echo of the soul itself; the sound emanates directly from it; it is its natural and immediate expression, which itself fashions as it controls the body, its instrument. Music ought to combine these instruments, and to harmonize them. In this respect, the progress of modern music is remarkable. The science of instrumentation has received developments unknown to the ancients.

But the harmonic element properly so called, and which approaches nearer to the physical quality of sound, consists in the determined character of each sound, and in its co-ordinate connection with other sounds.

It rests, in the first place, upon the specific quality of sound (its physical side), then upon numerical proportions and difference, varying with the body placed in vibration, the degree of tension, the number and mode of the vibrations—relations which are mathematically determined. This is what forms the harmonic system. Hence, 1st, the theory of *intervals*; 2d, the combined series of sounds in their most simple succession, the *diatonic scale* or *gamut*; 3d, the diversity of tones as proceeding some from others, and from a fundamental sound, the various kinds of tones, etc.

Thus far we have only simple series of sounds, a succession where each preserves its proper value. Now, it is their mutual connection which gives them a concrete existence and a real value. Through that they combine to form one and the same sound. It is this combination which forms the *chord*. Regularity should be also introduced into the chords, in conformity with the design of music. It is in the knowledge of these chords that the science of harmony properly so called, consists. It is sufficient to indicate the principal species of chords, and their gradation.

The first species is formed by sounds which accord immediately, of which nothing can alter the perfect consonance. Then there is manifested a more profound opposition where the immediate consonance is destroyed, which constitutes a depth of sound, and furnishes a suitable means for expressing the grand sentiments, the profound emotions of the soul, the joys, the sufferings, and the abysses of sorrow. This means is found in the *dissonant* chords. But it is necessary that in this opposition a real unity be revealed, a secret harmony, that the opposition be reconciled by a return to a perfect chord. This superior unity can only manifest itself in the completeness and the successive development of musical composition.

3. Harmony includes only the essential relations, the necessary laws of sounds; but it is not any more than measure and rhythm music properly so called. They are only its essential bases. The poetic element of music, the language of the soul, which causes its inmost joys and sorrows to circulate in sounds, frees it and lifts it up to higher spheres, is melody. It is only given to the composer of genius to speak worthily of it, if he join the philosophic spirit to the know-

ledge of his art; yet he cannot reveal its secrets. It is necessary, besides, to have made a profound study of the master-pieces of music. Hegel contents himself with making some general reflections.

In the first place, melody, although distinct from harmony, should not be separated from it. It should preserve a strict connection with it. In this, it does not sacrifice its liberty; it renounces only arbitrariness and fancy; for true liberty here, as everywhere, is conformity to law. It ought, then, to move itself upon the base of harmony and rhythm. Rhythm and harmony, on their side, have life and animation only through melody. It is in this union of harmony and melody that the secret of great musical composition resides.

We ought meanwhile to establish an important distinction which bears upon the predominance of the one or the other of these two means of expression. Sometimes melody simply takes for base the most simple harmonic chords; this is to escape dryness, and for fear of being superficial. Sometimes each tone of the melody forms for itself an accord, and the melody is wholly blended in the harmony; harmony and melody form a whole, compact and identical. Or it is a harmonious combination of melodies which forms harmonies; or, reciprocally, the movements of the melody penetrate into the harmonic relations. Thus, in bold compositions, are evoked oppositions and dissonances. But in the midst of all this outburst of the powers of the harmony appears the peaceful triumph of melody. Great artists alone are able to conquer these difficulties; otherwise, the music is labored or purely erudite.

But in all melody, in spite of this intimate accord, the *song*, properly so called, should be revealed, with its richness of expression, as the predominant element. At the same time, in spite of this richness and this variety, the whole should be firmly conceived and executed to form a complete and individual unit. By this alone, music expresses sentiment in its profundity; it imprints on the work the character of ideality and freedom; it enfranchises the soul and transports it to a higher sphere.

After having determined the general characteristics of music, and the nature of the means of expression which it has at its disposal, it remains to study it in its relations with the subject of which it treats.

Now, making abstraction of the various classes of music, music has sometimes as end the treating of a subject already expressed by word, or the *accompanying* of a text; sometimes it expresses the subject simply by harmonic and melodic combinations. In the first case, it is the *music of accompaniment*; in the second, the music is *independent*.

In that which concerns, in the first place, this distinction in itself, it is to be remarked, contrary to the vulgar opinion (which considers instrumental music as accompaniment and vocal music as the more independent), that it is rather the human voice, the song which accompanies the words. But this apparent contradiction effaces itself when we consider that the text ought to remain in the service of the music; to be made for that, and not that for it. What it ought to express, is the inmost sentiment of the subject, whether the composer is absorbed and identified with it, or whether he expresses rather the personal impression which the subject awakens in his soul.

We must always understand by musical accompaniment, what a subject already formulated expresses in a text; this is then, above all, vocal music, the song which accompanies the words. Instruments, in their turn, may accompany the voice; but it is rather the instrumental music which is independent, since it can dispense with all text, and then music restricts itself to its own means of expression.

As to the *music of accompaniment*, let us observe, in the first place, that if, in allying itself with a text already expressed by words, it is less independent, it ought not, meanwhile, to subordinate itself too much thereto, and to lose its liberty. Every obstacle to free musical production would destroy the impression; without wishing to emancipate himself from the text, the composer will then simply penetrate the general sense of words, of situations, to inspire himself with it, and to render it freely.

In this circle, we may distinguish three modes of expression. The first is what may be called the melodic style of expression. The music then devotes itself only to rendering the fundamental feature of a subject as it seizes it in the harmony of its inner being; it is the pure echo of sentiment, the harmonious sounding of the soul. For melody is the soul of music. There is, then, a

living and pathetic sentiment which vibrates in it. Nor does music leave this sentiment in its natural and gross existence. More than the other arts, it idealizes expression. It is especially given to moderate and sweeten the affections of the soul. It ought to be free in the outpourings of melody, to preserve its calmness and serenity in the midst of tears and suffering. This characteristic, which we have already had to notice in Italian painting, appears essentially in melodic expression. Music ought to exalt the soul above the particular sentiment which it feels, to cause it to hover in a serener region. It is this which, properly speaking, constitutes the *singing* principle of music. It is thus that it gives truly the idea of divine felicity and harmony.

But music cannot long remain at this height; it would risk losing itself in the vague and indeterminate; this necessitates it the more frequently to approach nearer the text, to take a more precise character—above all, if the subject itself is very determinate. Hence a difference of expression, according to the subjects, and the sentiments of the soul which it attempts to express. The character of the subject is given by the text itself. Here the opposite of melodic expression is the *recitative*, which makes of the song no more the principal thing, but the accompaniment. The particular sense of the words imprints itself then, with all its precision, in the sounds. This is the sung declamation, which connects itself rigorously with the movement of the words, in their sense and in their order. This recitative or declamatory expression is particularly adapted to the theatre, and to the peaceful recital of events; to the dramatic song, to the oratorio, to the dialogue, etc. It awakens sympathetic emotions; but one would seek vainly in it the expression of that inner life of the soul which characterizes melodic expression, song properly so called.

Hence, the necessity of an intermediate variety between recitative and melodic music, and one which unites their characteristics. The problem consists in so managing that melody, in determining itself further, may cause that which seems to be foreign to it in the recitative to enter its domain; music becomes thus recitative and melodic.

In order to make this whole question better comprehended, Hegel thinks himself obliged to enter into certain details—1st, upon the nature of the *text* which is adapted

to musical composition; 2d, upon the *composition* itself; 3d, upon the different *styles* of music where the mode of expression is different.

In the first place, as to musical text, we do wrong to think that it is indifferent to musical composition. All grand compositions have an excellent text, for the subject cannot be indifferent to the artist who avails himself of it. The first condition of a good text is solidity of thought. Not all possible skill can disguise an insignificant, trivial, frigid, absurd thought. In compositions of the melodic variety, the text is less important, but yet it exacts a true sentiment. In the second place, the musical text ought not to be a thought too profound or abstract. Philosophic profundity is not suited to music. This is why certain lyric poems cannot be set to music; those of Schiller, for example. On the other hand, the opposite excess is to be avoided, to-wit: insignificance, pretension, the absence of nobleness and dignity. What is necessary here, as in all the arts, is a sentiment natural, true, and profound, without being abstract or metaphysical. The most suitable is a certain mediocre poetry, which indicates, in a few words, a whole situation, and restrains itself from a complete development—a poetry clear, vivid, rapid—a sort of poetic sketch. The words ought not to paint the subject too much in its details, in order not to weaken the unity, the total effect, nor to distract the attention. In lyric poetry, the little pieces of verse, simple, laconic, stamped with a profound sentiment, or the still lighter poems where a lively gaiety breathes, are particularly appropriate to musical composition.

Upon *composition* itself, the rules to be given are very general, and more negative than positive. Talent and genius do not suffer themselves to be directed by recipes, and rules do not supply inspiration.

What must be repeated here, as for all works of art, is that the composer ought to identify himself with his subject, to penetrate it, to endue it with life, to place in it his soul and his whole heart.

Certain faults are to be avoided, into which our contemporaries are ever falling. The principal is the looking after effect—seeking to strike the imagination by violent contrasts, the expression of opposite passions—introducing, in a fragment, foreign motives, discordant oppositions, which break the unity of a subject, and are adverse to harmony

and beauty. It is by wishing thus to characterize too strongly, or to ally the *characteristic* to the melodic, that we break the delicately traced limits of musical beauty; we arrive thus at ruggedness, at hardness, at defect in harmony.

True musical beauty consists in this, that, even in strongly characterizing the passions and the sentiments, melody remains the fundamental trait, as the soul and bond of composition. Here to reach the true standard is very difficult, perhaps still more difficult in music than in the other arts. Hence the differing judgments according to the predominance of the two elements, some preferring melody, others the characteristic and great rigor of expression. This is a source of dispute between schools and connoisseurs.

Having reached the question of the different varieties of music, the author restricts himself to characterizing briefly *religious* music, *lyric* music, and *dramatic* music. He gives the preference to Catholic over Protestant music, which seems to him to discard more and more its aim, and to wander into vagueness—to become a learned exercise rather than a living production. Lyrical music is scarcely alluded to. As to dramatic music, he yields also the superiority to the moderns, for the reasons developed above. According to him, ancient music was only designed to bring into relief the musical sound of verse, and to cause the sense of it to penetrate deeper into the soul. Among moderns, dramatic music, after being perfected in the music of the church, has reached a high perfection in lyric expression, and obtained an independent place in the modern opera. It is to be regretted that these points were not treated at the length that they merit.

Under the name of *independent music*, Hegel treats of *instrumental* music. It accompanies, it is true, the voice; but it is independent in that it is no more bound to a precise sense expressed by words, or to a text. Music, truly free, enfranchises itself, then, from the text, in order to seize a subject, to determine its movement and the mode of expression. Already, in vocal music, this enfranchisement is taking place through the melodic element, as in the opera, especially in the Italian opera. But this independence manifests itself especially in instrumental music. For instruments, the necessity of a text no more exists. The orchestra which executes symphonies is all-

sufficient. This is a purely musical performance. It consists of learned accords, melodies, and masses of harmony. Hence this is the proper domain of the connoisseur and the dilettante. The uninitiate loves more characterized expression; the connoisseur, secret accords, musical relations of sounds and instruments, learned combinations, all of which cause him to admire the talent of the artist—in a word, music for the sake of the music. The composer, on his side, while developing exclusively a content of ideas, troubles himself less for the thought than for the musical structure. The reef to be avoided is vacuum of composition, frigidity, absence of ideas and expression. The true course consists in combining the two sides, in following at the same time the thought and the musical structure, and this even in instrumental music. Here, however, there is dominant the personal will of the artist, sometimes pushed even to caprice and fancy. Without doubt, general rules—the laws of art—do not completely lose their empire. But in this limitless circle, where the originality of the artist revolves, it can give itself up to flashes and fancies, can abandon itself to the free play of his imagination. Nowhere, in any other art, is there a place for similar independence, a liberty so great.

This theory of music ends with some observations on *musical execution*. There is no art, in fact, where the execution may be so intimately bound to the art itself, of which it makes an integral part. In order that composition may be living and produce its effect, it is necessary that it be executed by a musician who has himself talent, and at times inspiration. Now in execution, as in musical expression, we can distinguish two tendencies, two principal styles: the first, where the musician, charged with rendering a composition, loses himself, is absorbed in his subject, and is contented simply to reproduce it with fidelity; the second, where he frees himself from it more or less, and

creates for himself the expression, the mode of exposition, not only after the work of the composer, but with his personal resources. In the first case, he resembles a rhapsodist who sings an epic; in the second, an actor who creates his rôle. The choice and the rule to follow here depend on the nature of the subject. If the composition is solid, substantial, to the extent that the subject has passed wholly into it, the reproduction ought to be faithful. The player should here submit himself to it—should be an obedient organ, which does not mean to say that he should be an automaton. In place of machine playing, he ought to vivify the work by a full expression of soul in the sense and in the spirit of the composer, to resolve difficulties with ease and facility, to attain to the same elevation as the genius of the composer. Here is true liberty for him. In subjects of less solidity, where the imagination of the composer has given itself free rein, has abandoned itself to caprice and fancy, the execution also will be more unrestrained. Here the musician can display all the boldness of his genius and of his culture—can finish, deepen, animate that which seems to him destitute of soul—can show himself, in his turn, free and a creator.

This liberty is yet greater for instrumentation than for the voice. The musician can use an instrument as the organ of his soul, and reveal the power which he exercises over it by playing with difficulties apparently insurmountable; can abandon himself to all his eccentricities, to his whims and his fancies, even producing on one instrument sounds and effects which belong to other instruments. He shows thereby that no bound can stay him; he reveals the marvellous secret by which an instrument becomes like an animate organ, which with him forms a body, whereinto his soul has wholly passed, and which it governs with its will. It is the most perfect fusion of conception and execution.